„Culture has to become an instrument for securing of interests of the state foreign policy and economy, as well as creation of its positive image.” This is a quotation from the Survey of Russian Federations’ Foreign Policy of 2007 – the document designed on the directive of the then Russia’s President V.Putin. Such objective should not be surprising for us, Russia is not the only country wishing to influence the other international policy players by the means of its attractiveness.
According to the main theoretician of the concept of soft power Joseph S.Nye, this concept is based on eventual influencing the actors by attractiveness derived from the sources of soft power – culture (in locations where it is attractive for the others), values (if the state follows them both inside the country and outside it) and foreign policy (if it is considered legitimate and a moral authority). In his book, published in 2004, “Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics” Nye speaks about soft power which, contrary to the hard one, can alter behaviour of countries without coercion or offering of economic benefits. In other words, soft power stimulates the others to wish what you wish, because you possess authority based on charisma.
Western researchers, considering the Russia’s soft power possibilities in the West, usually are sceptical. Quite different situation is around the influence on the target audience in the Russia neighbouring countries. Radio Free Europe communications director Donald Jensen, while participating in 2005 in a discussion of the newly established in Russia television channel “Russia Today”, mentioned that the long-term cultural influence and the large number of the inhabitants of Russian nationality in the Russia neighbouring countries are Russia’s strong points, implementing any soft power strategy in the CIS member states.
In his interview of October 2008 to the newspaper “Rossijskaya Gazeta”, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that the relations with Russian compatriots abroad would be developed taking the soft power principles as the basis. Thereby, here one cannot do without culture as the means for winning the compatriots’ hearts and minds. In the ideological concept “Russian World”, Russian culture along with religion and the Russian language, is the decisive feature of belonging to the community of compatriots. The abovementioned concept speaks about “Russian World” as a civilization formation joining representatives of all waves of Russian emigration and the very Russia. Initially it developed rather independently of the Russia’s official politics. The situation changed when V.Putin came to power, and the concept “Russian World” entered the official circulation.
Experts formulated first ideas even in 1990s. In 2000 Pyotr Schedrovitsky publicized the article “Russian World and Transnational Russian Characteristics” where he presented the main ideas and objectives of Russian World to the public. The Russian language was stressed as one of the cornerstones of “Russian World”. Schedrovitsky follows the 18th century German philosopher Herder’s ideas on the mutual correlation between the processes of language and thinking. Same as Herder, Schedrovitsky considers that a culture may be learned only through its carrier – language. He insists that those who speak Russian in their everyday life – also think Russian, and as the result they act Russian. The setting up of the foundation “Russkiy Mir” in 2007 under supervision of the close to the Kremlin political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov, is one of the examples of practical implementation of the concept of “Russian World”. Popularizing of the Russian language and culture abroad is one of the main objectives of the foundation.
“The once united space of “Russian World” is now divided by various countries’ frontiers. However, the nations residing on the territory of historical Russia, are to be aware of their belonging to a common civilization, and they have to regard the “Russian World” as an extra-national project”.1 These words were said by the head of Russian Orthodox Church – Patriarch Kiril – at the opening ceremony of the Russian World 3rd Assembly on November 3, 2009.
In 1990s the growing nationalism in Russia began to pose threats to normal multi-ethnical functioning of the state. A strict connection between the definition of the notion of compatriot with ethnical characteristics and fixing of a legal status (a card or certificate of compatriot) could cause a counter-reaction both in Russia and in the Russia neighbouring countries. Thereby there appeared a necessity for “Russian World” as an overall concept allowing avoidance of legal and political difficulties. Besides, that would allow to join representatives of all waves of Russian emigration – those who left to seek better living conditions, those who were forced to leave because of political motives and those who consider that they have not gone anywhere, rather “the state has taken its departure” leaving them outside its frontiers” – in a single formation.
Since belonging to the cultural-linguistic group is the main characteristic feature of “Russian World”, its boundaries are not strictly delimited. That allows Russian federal authorities implementation of their policy of “protection of compatriots’ interests” against a broad layer of foreign countries’ citizens, according to concrete situations. This assumption is supported by V.Putin’s speech of October 2001 at the Congress of Compatriots Residing Abroad: “Compatriot is definitely not a legal category. [..] For, since the very beginning, the concept “Russian World” has gone far beyond the geographical boundaries of Russia and even beyond the Russian ethnic boundaries.”2
The authors of “Russian World” consider involvement of the compatriots residing abroad in gaining of economic benefits, for example, drawing investments to Russia, as one of the main tasks of “Russian World”. Thereby, no matter how nice is the facade of the cultural cooperation (of course, a quite positive tendency), it is hiding the regular Russia’s objective of extensive development.
The idea of clash of civilizations is used in Russia’s political rhetoric as an explanation of counter-balancing the US and EU influence in the Russia neighbouring countries. In such a way attempts are made to find a legitimate pretext for an active foreign policy against the CIS, Baltic countries and Russian compatriots residing there. These countries are regarded as a battlefield for two civilizations. Especially in 2004 – 2006, under the influence of “revolutions of colours”, Russian politicians used to cite the 19th century Slavophiles speaking about opposition between civilizations. The active supporter of compatriots policy Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov wrote in his article of 2006 “We and the West” that, in order to survive in the opposition against the West, Russia has to integrate around itself the future part of the world, first of all the post-Soviet space and the “world of compatriots”.3
J.Nye stresses that the “soft power” all the same is the power. If it is “in the wrong hands”, same as any other instruments, it may bring about negative consequences. He writes that soft power has no ethical limits, thereby a country can try to create attractiveness without initial defining final objectives. Such dictators as Hitler, Stalin and Mao seemed very attractive to many of their followers in a particular period. The world is in progress, military means are replaced by more “sophisticated” instruments of influence. However, as it is reminded by Nye, when you lose your money it is of no importance how your wallet has been taken away – by cheating or by threatening…
Centre for East European Policy Studies, in cooperation with research centres from Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, has worked out research „The „Humanitarian Dimension” of Russian Foreign Policy Toward Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and, the Baltic States” (available on http://appc.lv/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Research_2009.pdf ). It presents a detailed insight in the themes touched upon in this article. The project is supported by Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Soros Foundation – Latvia and National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The researchers’ activities over the period of seven months have resulted in significant conclusions summarized in five research sections – Russia’s Human Rights Practice, Russia’s Policy toward Its Compatriots Residing Abroad, Consular Issues, Cooperation in the Spheres of Culture and Science, as well as Russia’s Mass Media Activities in the Neighbouring Countries. Comparative analysis allows the researchers a better understanding of the 21st century Russia’s foreign policy tendencies and concluding that Russia still has not rejected its idea on the “near abroad” as the zone of its exclusive interests.
If the situation is compared, for example, in the three Baltic countries, the movement of Russian “compatriots” is strongest in Latvia. Russia’s extreme goal is to become a regional superpower and force these countries to turn their faces towards Russia with the following changes in their foreign policy course. Then it would gradually develop in a global power. Lately nostalgia for the USSR period is intentionally cultivated in Russia. In September 2009, at the conference held in Estonian capital Tallinn, dedicated to the issues regarding the Molotov – Ribentrop pact, the abovementioned fact was admitted regretfully by the Russian Research Centre “Memorial” vice-chairman Nikita Petrov and Moscow State University lecturer Irina Karatsuba. Besides, television channel “RTR Planeta” has begun to broadcast a programme called “The best time in our life” about the period of the USSR. Journalists from Russia arrive in Latvia to shoot films about the “good time in the USSR” and “huge losses after the collapse of the USSR”. And these are just few examples. The nostalgia for the USSR is cultivated with the aim to suggest that maybe its renewal would not be too bad – if not in the form it once existed, then at least ideologically, with Moscow as the centre.
However, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are the EU and NATO member countries, and the alliance is the guarantor for their security. But it is also the reason why Russia wishes to strengthen its positions in this region, trying to influence the EU and NATO processes through the Baltic States. In case suspicions arise that Russia gets a too strong influence over any of these countries, NATO would have to react. The risk lies in the possibility that such country can turn in a lobbyist of Russia’s interests in EU and unreliable NATO member which cannot be entrusted sensitive information. Thereby politicians should be aware of the risks. The Russian “soft power” projects are by no means something coincidental, they have a long-term character, and they will not end either tomorrow or the day after. Results of the event analysis show that Russia is not a neutral observer of the processes. First of all, Russia has concrete ideas how to implement soft power, second, the ideas are included in political documents, sounded in the speeches of higher-ranking politicians, and the methods of their implementation are quite obvious.
Influence through politicizing of culture is carried out by various means – through Russian culture centres in target countries, inter-governmental agreements on cooperation in culture sphere, interpretation of historical data, the network, values and possibilities of Orthodox Church, popular culture (films and concerts), and one of the most widely used means – through the mass media messages. That is one of the conclusions of the research „The „Humanitarian Dimension” of Russian Foreign Policy toward Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and, the Baltic States”.
At a recent European and Asian media forum in Moscow, Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev promised a special support for the Russian language press in the foreign countries. To his opinion, such activities should not be regarded the interfering in the other countries’ domestic matters.
However, it is widely acknowledged that the media is one of the most important social agents influencing formation and opinion of an individual. They have a long-term impact on his/her political choice. If media receive sponsorship from Russia, and their content is developed according to its values and instructions, that would inevitably have impact on the opinion and political preferences of the audience. Thereby loyalty to the country of residence would decrease, the compatriots would increasingly identify themselves with Russia, its aggressive policy and values, the Soviet period would be glorified – such political characteristics are popularized by, for example, Russia’s media in Latvia, according to the research authors. Foreign Policy Association of Moldova researcher Radu Vrabie indicates that the strong influence of Russian media in Moldova has resulted in the situation when the citizens regard Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev as the most popular politicians, not the Moldovan leaders. The population of Moldova live, in fact, in the information space of Russia.
The researchers forecast: if Russia succeeds in increasing its influence on the Baltic countries and the other neighbouring states, it would not lessen its appetite. Also the other Western countries will face its pressure. Here one should be aware of Russia’s political mentality: complying is not a compromise – it is an expression of weakness, therefore – let’s move ahead! In case Russia grows economically, it will continue its sabre-rattling and the soft power project implementation. All instruments will be used to strengthen the positions.
During the cold war period, it was clear for the West what were the USSR’s intentions in the sphere of propaganda, the West was following them, conducting counter-attacks. Now the Western states do not pay sufficient attention to the East European countries which feel like being within the “range of fire”. The fight for the people’s hearts and minds still goes on.