Russian policy toward Ukraine: interests, methods and Ukrainian response
Petro Burkovskiy, the National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine, Kyiv)
From the very first years of independence and until 2005 the Ukrainian-Russian relations had been characterized by an asymmetric interdependency between a former metropolis and a colony. Ukraine was regarded by the Moscow decision makers as a strategic territory that is in numerous aspects vital for keeping Russian national interests safe.
The basic strategic Russian interests in Ukraine (1991 – 2009) are:
- Non-alignment of Ukraine with the US-sponsored alliances and organizations, such as NATO, which were founded to contain USSR, and later Russia. Since 2001 the list included also GUAM (from 2005 the Community for Democratic Choice). Since September 2008 Russia has also demanded to stop military cooperation with Georgia. It is also welcomed that Ukraine should be loyal with the Russian position within such organizations as the United Nations, Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States.
- Guarantees of the favorable conditions for the Black See Fleet naval base in Sevastopol and extension of the Treaty about Naval Base in Sevastopol after 2017. Ukraine inherited naval base from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which was divided during 1992 – 1997 between Ukraine and Russia. Since that time Sevastopol has been claimed by Russians as a “Russian city” that must belong to Russia. Using this blackmail and a tool of gaz debts Russians made Ukraine agree with existence of the naval base until 2017. As far as Russia doesn’t have alternative naval base on the Black Sea, the pressure on Ukraine about prolonging Treaty on Naval Base in Sevastopol would only grow.
- Respect of the Russian language, religious and other “cultural rights” of Russian ethnical minority (from 2005official Kremlin has been using concept of “Russian-speaking majority”). From 2005 – to stop making efforts to create alternative historic discourse from a Ukrainian-centric point of view. In spite of the fact that in southern Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where ethnic Russians constitute 60% of population and Ukrainians only 10%, there are 96% elementary and secondary schools with Russian language of studying. In all other regions, where Russian-speaking population constitutes 30-50%, a number of the Russian-language schools make 40-60%. This numbers are decreasing due to the politics of Ministry of Education to meet the needs of Ukrainian speaking populqation but this process is called a “forceful Ukrainization”. Intention to commemorate victims of the Great Famine of 1932-1933 as casualties of genocide also has met resistance from Russia, which for some reason fears to become an object of the legal suits despite assurances from the Ukrainian authorities. Another problem is a different view of Ukrainian authorities on the role of Ukraine in the Second World War and description of the USSR as aggressor and occupant of the same kind as Nazi Germany.
- Laissez-faire regime for the Russian private and state corporations in Ukraine and unrestricted access for them to the key Ukrainian industrial and energy assets, such as gaz transportation system. Since late 1990es Russian companies managed to take over 2/3 of the oil refinement industry, 100% of aluminum industry, invested in the electricity distribution (100% control over 6 regional energy distribution companies and substantial share in 10 companies out of 27). Between 2005 – 2008 Swiss company, controlled by Gazprom, possessed internal gaz market of Ukraine and bought almost 50% of the local gaz distribution companies. According to the expert estimates, share of Russian banks in the banking sector has grown to 25% by 2008[1], in the telecommunication market Russian companies are present in all major players. In the Crimea Russian businesses through offshore and affiliated Ukrainian companies have bought out significant share of the expensive seaside land resources.
- Coordination of the trade relations, especially after Ukraine’s accession to WTO (2008); rapprochement in the framework of the Common Economic Space (Customs Union, Free Trade Area). The total trade turnover between Ukraine and Russian has raised from in 1995 $13,7 bln. (negative balance $ -0,53 bln.) to $35,1 bln. (negative balance $ -3,67 bln.). Russia is a critical market for the Ukrainian agricultural goods and food products, chemicals, black metals and sub-products, pipes, heavy machine-building and transport, military industry. On the other hand, Russia is also a critical supplier of the natural gaz (70% of domestic consumption, including 100% of industrial consumption), oil (between 40% and 30% depending on market conditions). For Russia Ukraine is important in respect of keeping stable domestic prices for food and as a main transit country of gaz and other industrial goods to the European Union and one of the biggest consumers of gaz. A lot of Ukrainian products and materials are cheaper comparing with analogues from other countries, especially in the sphere of airspace machine-building. Therefore, Moscow still has plans to incorporate Ukrainian economy as a useful subsidiary and supplier of cheap products, labor and services to Russian economy in the framework of the supranational economic organization or association. It is regarded as an “engine” for rapid economic re-integration in the post-Soviet space as the German-French partnership inside EU.
- Promotion of the bilateral military and security cooperation (mergers of military-industrial complexes, re-establishment of the common system of the anti-air and anti-missile defence). Russia sees Ukraine as a strategic territory, which can be used by its potential enemies (US, NATO) to threaten Russian heartland, its position in the Caucasus and close exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.
- Domination of the pro-Russian political forces and parties in the Ukrainian government. Since 1991 Russia permanently has been using a concept of “nationalist threat” to treat political parties and leaders, who decided to conduct independent policies and protect national interests of Ukraine in competition with Russia.
On the other hand, Russia was basically perceived by Ukrainians as a friendly nation, a state, which should be the main partner in all key political and economic spheres. And the Russian authorities were always aware of it and used it. According to the annual sociological monitoring, conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 57,1% Ukrainians supported the idea of developing ties with Russia and other CIS countries in 1994. In 2000 the share of pro-Russian citizens reduced to the lowest 42,8%. It again peaked at 58,8% in 2004, drastically fell to 48,5% next year after the Orange Revolution but revived to 55,3% in 2008 and 2009. At the same time majority of Ukrainians also supported idea of membership in the Western structures, namely, the European Union.
These popular attitudes toward Russia were among the strongest factors that shaped strategies of the top Ukrainian politicians. During 1994 – 2001 President Leonid Kuchma, who was the main foreign policy decision maker, developed so-called “multi-vectored” policy. It was assumed that Ukraine would use its relations with the West to confront excessive Russian pressure, while take into account Russian concerns to benefit from the growing trade with the neighbor. It was obvious that due to the institutional and international weakness of Russia, Ukraine was able to counterbalance its pressure by strengthening ties with the European Union and the US. The example of such bargaining is the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed in the package with General Agreement on Stationing of Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, which was also linked to the agreement of restructuring Ukrainian debts for natural gas consumed in 1992-1994. Simultaneously, Ukraine pushed forward its relation with NATO, and in 1997 after signing treaty with Russia Kuchma blessed the Charter on the Distinctive Partnership with NATO.
As far as Kyiv demonstrated its willingness to take into account them, Moscow show its good will to consider Ukrainian concerns. If they weren’t met, Moscow punished Ukraine using tools of protectionism and gaz debts. For example, when in 2000 Kuchma appointed pro-Western Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko and spurred Ukraine’s integration in the NATO and EU, Russia threatened to increase prices for gaz. In April 2002 when Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council adopted decision to move toward full-scale membership in NATO Russia started a trade war, which continued until the end of the year. In 2006 when President Viktor Yushchenko increased pressure on Russia and intended unilaterally restrict conditions of the Black Sea Fleet stationing in Crimea, Russia closed its markets for a wide range of Ukrainian products for 6-8 months.
The most famous examples of Ukrainian-Russian standoffs, from the Western point of view, were so-called “gaz wars” of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009, which cost more to Europeans than the parties of conflict. In 2005 Putin made clear message that Gazprom would not continue practice of supplying gaz to Ukraine for prices which are substantially lower than in the EU. Political reason for such decision was not hidden: loyal Belorus and Armenia received gaz with discounts while “pro-American” Georgia and Ukraine were said to pay “full price”.
It should be, however, mentioned that the root of gaz conflicts comes not from geopolitics but shadow dealings in gaz trade. Members of the new team of Yushchenko decided to adhere to the schemes used by Kuchma’s cronies. Contrary to that, Tymoshenko’s team insisted on destroying it. Conflict inside the new Ukrainian government significantly weakened Ukrainian position in negotiations with Gazprom and Turkmenistan. The outcome was the short gaz war between 1-4 of January 2006, lost access to Turkmen gaz and implementation of Swiss intermediary company RosUkrEnergo (RUE, 50% owned by Gazprom, 50% – by Ukrainian tycoon Dmitriy Firtash) into gaz trade between Russia and Ukraine. RUE co-owner Firtash easily penetrated into President’s entourage as well as remained among and secured his dominative position in Ukrainian gaz market until 2008. The results of such schemes were really disastrous for Ukrainian security: debts of private company were transferred to the state company (in 2007 $2 bln.). And another debt of $600 mln., which new Prime Minister Tymoshenko in 2008 refused to accept as state, provoked a new gaz war. An attempt of Yushchenko and Firtash reinstate RUE in the gaz market in December 2008 – January 2009 released new edition of the “gaz war”. Finally, Putin and Tymoshenko agreed to the “formula approach” in defining ga prices without political implications, but in conditions of the economic recession it brought new risks for Ukrainian independence.
Therefore, we can assume that Ukraine has struggled with Russian influence and interference more successfully if Russia was more preoccupied with internal problems (economic decline). But the absence of real reforms in political, economic and military spheres resulted in growing dependency from the Russian resources, which were usually supplied for political loyalty.
However, it should be admitted that growing Russian influence in Ukraine suffered a great defeat in 2004. Kremlin could not prevent the Orange revolution and help pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich to become President.
Since 2005 Ukrainian foreign policy has become more Western-oriented. New President Viktor Yushchenko, influenced by Euro-Atlantist and Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk, comprehend an approach that Ukraine must protect its interest and prevent Russian interference by posing high demands in spheres where Kremlin had not been troubled since late 1990s. For President Viktor Yushchenko relations with Russia were a “zero-sum game”. Such attitude was publicly expressed and pursued after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. President Yushchenko is concerned that after the “Orange Revolution” he became a personal foe of the Russian authorities. Thus strengthening of the country’s independence from Russia meant also consolidation of his power.
Nevertheless, in 2005 – 2009, Ukraine under Yushchenko could not make “a great leap forward” to the EU and NATO. Despite his official Euro-Atlantic stance President’s actions resembled a “multi-vector policy” of Kuchma era. The main reasons were corruption and an increasing institutional weakness of the Ukrainian state. It has helped Russians to pursue more actively and transparently its interests in Ukraine and demand from its Western partners to stay out of the “exclusive sphere of interest in Ukraine”.
The failure in 2004 did not changed Russian understanding of the strategic interests in Ukraine. What Russians have done is a review of methods of achieving strategic goals. However, there is a discussion inside the Russian elites which method of dealing with Ukraine is more adequate: the use of the “hard” security instruments (as in case with Georgia) or “soft” security instruments (Belorus).
In our opinion, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin[2] is currently backing “soft” approach as far as Ukrainian state has been weakened and there is no threat of the rapid Ukrainian integration in the Western security structures. On the other hand, it seems that Russian President D.Medvedev is experimenting with the quasi-“hard’ instruments[3]. But it rather serves a warning of what can happen if Putin decide to change his approach (e.g. apply the new Russian legislation about use of its Armed Forces abroad to protect its “citizens”).
There are three main reasons why we assume that Kremlin will use “soft” methods in the short-term. First of all, an economic recession, which hit state energy monopolies and reduced state budget revenues, would deter Russia from radical scenarios (such as limited intervention or even trade war) that could damage its investment image, diplomatic position and cost vast resources.
Secondly, the presidential elections in Ukraine that will cause transfer of power from Yushchenko to more moderate politician. Putin’s entourage drew lesson from 2004 and understand that hostile actions toward Ukraine or overpressure can mobilize anti-Russian sentiments and supporters of integration to NATO during elections.
The third reason is a spread corruption inside Ukrainian ruling elites, which are able to trade off national interests for economic gains. Russia has already received guarantees from three major favorites of the presidential races that its interests in Ukraine would be respected. And these guarantees would be strengthened by the mechanisms of economic benefits for the team of winner.
On the other hand, Russia still has opportunity to use destructive methods of political influence. The main task is to create problems for Ukrainian authorities, undermine state institutions and regional coherence to the level, when emergence of nation-wide leadership will become virtually impossible. In situation when neither political force nor stable political coalition can represent the interests of the majority of population, when a half of population would be more susceptible to Russian propaganda, when political process in Ukraine develops in the pattern of “guided conflict”, Kremlin would retain a unique role of arbiter, who distribute power, brings stability and shape decisions of the official Kyiv.
These threats are monitored by special agencies in Ukraine but active measures to counter them are not taken because of absence of a developed plan how to build a balance in relations with Russia with accepting important forms of cooperation and preventing dangerous actions.
Tactical political methods of Russia of gaining control over Ukraine after 2005:
- Provoking disunity among the nationalist-minded and western-oriented political forces in Ukraine.
- Support of loyal political forces in Ukraine. Viktor Yanukovich (leader of the biggest parliamentary Party of Regions, Prime minister in 2002-2004 and 2006-2007), Petro Symonenko (leader of the Communist Party, which has been represented in the parliament since 1991) are regularly consulted in Moscow about the most important issues of Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy.
- Breeding radical (even extremist) anti-Ukrainian, anti-Tatar, anti-Semitic organizations in Ukraine which can be used to destabilize situation in Ukraine. According to the reports of Security Serveice of Ukraine, most racist, extremist and Anti-Semitic organizations are supported from Russia.
- Clandestine support of the separatist-like movements in the Crimea, Donbas and Odesa. The latest scandal of such activity touched upon two Russian diplomats, who worked in Odesa and Sevastopol. It was proved that Russan diplomat delivered money to businessman and deputy of city council of Odesa Ihor Markov, who headed pro-Russian radical party “Rodina”. Markov was recently charged with organization of clashes with casualties with pro-Western activists in Odesa.
- Organizing media and psychological warfare inside Ukraine in order to create among Ukrainians image of the Ukrainian state as corruptive and failed government. Russian media fiercely attacked Yushchenko’s independent policies during 2004 – 2009 and supported any political scandal in Ukraine in order to portray Ukraine as a “failed state”, which should “return” to Russia.
The Russian stakes in the Ukrainian elections has not changed since 2004. The major task is to regain influence over Ukraine after 5 years of detachment. We can assume that tactically Russia is interested in the dissent and turmoil in Ukraine. In this case it can play a very important role of an external “broker” or even “judge” that settle down differences and guide its internal and foreign policies. But strategically Russia is interested in a stable and consolidated Ukraine under Russian supremacy.
[1] For reference see (in Ukrainian): http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/4a938c30cd49c/
[2] Speaking about Putin we also mean a number of people in his administration (his aides, cronies, advisors) who are involved in the decision-making process about Ukraine and communications with Ukrainian elites. Among the most influential members are: Ihor Sechin (Vice-Prime Minister), Viktor Chernomyrdin (ex-Ambassador to Ukraine in 2001 – 2009), Viktor Medvedchuk (ex-Head of Administration of President of Ukraine), Dmitriy Medvedev (President of Russia).
[3] His latest address in his personal Internet blog to President Viktor Yushchenko on 4th of August, which resulted in the ‘war of words” right a year after the Russian-Georgian war.