“The possibility is allowed regarding use of nuclear weapons depending on the eventual adversary’s plans and circumstances. In the critical for national security situation, nuclear attack on aggressor cannot be excluded, and a preventive attack is possible.” – Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in his interview to the newspaper “Rosijskaja Gazeta”, 20.11.2009
The recently adopted by Russian Security Council “Military Defence Doctrine” stipulates for use of nuclear weapons for pure preventive needs. Russia’s foreign policy lacked such precedent for nearly twenty years, since the end of the cold war. While speaking about such eventual attack, Nikolai Patrushev offers quite pragmatic considerations, for example, the necessity to use nuclear weapons is based on the following arguments:
- NATO continues its advance towards Russia’s frontier. Besides, after the nine years long interruption, the US renewed its strategic military manoeuvres with potential implementation of nuclear weapons;
- Growing proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, international terrorism;
- Tension in the Arctic region related to competition for deposits of energy resources;
- Separate countries, such as Japan, have increasing territorial claims;
- Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the conflicts in the Middle East, South Asian and African countries, as well as in the Korean Peninsula impact the global situation in the medium term;
- There also exist serious internal military threats, for example, in the Northern Caucasus.[1]
The five causes, mentioned by N.Patrushev, why the new doctrine was created as such, and the envisaged possibility of implementation of nuclear weapons raises serious concerns about the threat of Russia’s military intervention in some specific regions. In this case, the main point is not the preventive use of nuclear weapons, for Russia will hardly use nuclear weapons just to frighten anyone. The fact is much more important that the doctrine and strategy stipulate for possibility of deployment of Russia’s troops in the other countries in case threats are posed to the state of Russia or its citizens. European countries, and especially the Baltic ones, should be concerned about that, not about the eventual situation that Russia one day might throw nuclear warheads thousands of kilometres from Moscow.
By this military doctrine, Russia openly warns that the Georgia conflict may be repeated, and it will surely be repeated if anyone dears to disobey the Kremlin. Moscow stresses also that, in case it announces a part of the Arctic seabed as its property, it would have the respective right to defend its territorial water area, using any military resources at its disposal (as it is well known, in the next decade, the one who obtains the major part of the Arctic continental shelf, will prevail in the global oil and gas market).
As regards international terrorism, for nearly a decade it serves for Moscow as a pretext for continuing the bloodshed in Chechnya. The Kremlin initiated the second war against Chechnya using the excuse of necessity to combat international terrorism, next the Nord-Ost and Beslan tragic incidents followed when the Kremlin again could implement the slogans of fight against international terrorism. Why do Americans have their international terrorists, but Russians don’t?
Speaking about territorial claims, N.Patrushev mentions Japan as the example. The Japan’s request for the South Kuril Islands, why the World War II has not formally ended yet, is hardly the real cause why such item is included in the Russia’s defence doctrine. It is rather the security guarantee for Abkhazia and South Osetia in exchange for their territorial-ideological belonging to their mother Russia.
Maybe Russia really wishes to improve its military and defence policy in general, because for 20 years it has stagnated in the nostalgia for the power of the Soviet Army. However, the doctrine is sooner similar to diplomatic attempts on the part of Russia aimed at reminding of its military might and the constant need to resolve conflicts by force means. One of the Patrushev’s statements on the closeness of NATO to Russia’s frontier let us compare it with one more occasion when the Baltic countries and Poland were warned not to feel too safe under the NATO umbrella, for Russia and Belarus have imitated eventual attack on Poland, and why not to materialize it?
[1] Rossijskaja Gazeta, 20.11.2009