The Future Dynamic of the US-Baltic Transatlantic Relationship

Vienne Abrahamian

The post-World War II transatlantic atmosphere was one that prized institutional partnerships and multilateralism. In a time where international security and stability was questioned, exacerbated by the Cold War and the lingering threat of the spread of communism, the transatlantic alliance was viewed as a necessity. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created to increase military cohesion in Europe, and the United States invested heavily in rebuilding Western Europe’s security. Where global threat perceptions were high, transatlantic strength and solidarity was congruent.  

In the early 1990s, Soviet republics that were beginning their transition towards autonomy also understood the value of international institutions for state building. The Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) were among the first of the Soviet Union to push for regaining of independence, quickly working to integrate themselves within the Western framework. Accession into NATO in 2004 for the Baltic States represented a monumental shift for the region’s global governance. Not only did they gain a strategic edge in collective defense, but a fresh alignment with liberal democratic ideologies that spanned throughout Europe to the United States. These alliances ultimately become a notable motivating factor for maintaining ethical governance and free-market democracies in the region.   

While the democratization of Eastern Europe marked a significant political transformation, longstanding geopolitical tensions have endured throughout the 21st century. The 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shaken contemporary European politics. Economic and defense-related initiatives are constantly in motion to curb Russian aggression throughout the region. Past sentiments towards transatlantic cohesion, however, have not remained in place, and this has been showcased throughout US President Donald Trump’s second presidential term. The United States has manifested an alternative narrative towards how it views transatlantic partnerships, appearing to dismiss the importance of multilateral partnerships for defense and diplomacy. The necessity of NATO has been regularly questioned, the US has threatened to invade allied territories, and US financial and military support for Ukraine during the war has faltered. Washington’s tendency to favor transactional relationships and discredit the institutions that were once the pinnacle of transatlantic solidarity have caused lasting discrepancies for Europe’s reliance on the United States. 

Within this shift in transatlantic relationships comes the Baltic States, sitting on NATO’s Eastern flank. For proximity alone, the Baltic States are susceptible to Russian aggression on both hybrid and conventional levels. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 stimulated the necessity of a revised security doctrine regarding the potential for Russian influence throughout the region, and this has been exacerbated since 2022. In 2020, the Baltic Security Initiative (BSI) was introduced by U.S. Congress to fund military exercises and joint defense programs between the United States and the Baltics. Since the 2021 fiscal year to 2025, the Baltic Security Initiative has provided around $1 billion to support the security environment of the region. The United States has rotational troops deployed to the Baltic States, as well as military equipment and armaments. Additionally, the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act on behalf of the United States permitted a guaranteed $350 million be allocated to the BSI until 2028. The initiative was an important symbol of the U.S.-Baltic transatlantic solidarity.

The U.S. has been cognizant of the necessity of a secure Baltic region, as well as the role it could play in funding that. The region is a strategic gateway for NATO’s military strength against Russia. With a regular rotation of American troops to the Baltic region and continuous military exercises on both land and sea, NATO’s defense posture is strengthened and deterrence against Russian aggression can be maintained. NATO and the U.S.’s European allies are a critical resource for ensuring that Russia cannot impede on global security structure, and U.S. presence in the Baltics, whether through physical troop deployments or military aid, sends a message to Russia that there is a collective front willing to mobilize against it.  

In September of 2025, however, U.S. President Donald Trump’s budget proposal for 2026 alluded to the termination of the BSI. Termination to Section 333 funding, which had provided around $500 million to the Baltic States from 2018-2022 alone, had also been suggested. The reason for proposing significant cuts to U.S. aid for Baltic security efforts lies in Washington’s desire to distance itself from financial obligations to Europe. The current age of the transatlantic partnership between the U.S. and Europe is one of self-dependency and decreased cooperation during times of geopolitical threats.     

This approach to foreign policy is often referred to as flexible realism. The United States hopes to pursue international relations only when a partnership is realistic to its own national interests. In turn, alliances become expendable, international institutions become invalidated, and the most important aspect of foreign policy is U.S. dominance. The expectation that dominating powers should not need to participate in multilateralism for the benefit of an alliance has raised questions over the future of U.S.-Baltic transatlantic dynamics. Beyond that, it presents a new necessity for

Europe to adapt to growing U.S. financial and military unreliability. A transformation in the

Baltic’s security environment is already underway, and self-sufficiency in defense is notable. 

The Baltics have worked to sustain their GDP per defense obligation to NATO, recently becoming the top leaders in defense spending within the institution. Their dedication towards collective security has been showcased well before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In 2014, Latvia maintained 0.94% of its GDP on defense, falling short of NATO’s benchmark of 2% at that time. By 2018, the country had managed to reach the 2.02% benchmark, and just short of a decade after the Russian annexation of Crimea, Latvia had successfully reached 3.1% GDP on defense. In 2014, Lithuania only maintained .88% of its GDP towards defense, reaching NATO’s goal of 2% in 2019. Estonia was able to reach 2.03% GDP towards defense by 2015. In 2022, only seven NATO members had reached the defense expenditure goal, including all three Baltic States.

NATO currently has placed a benchmark of 5% of GDP on defense for its member states by 2035. In their individual defense budget proposals for 2026, the Baltic States addressed the state of their defense spending. Estonia is set to achieve 5.4% of its GDP on defense within a four-year defense plan with an approved additional $3.5 billion to its budget. Lithuania allocates 5.37% of GDP to defense, and Latvia has reached 4.73% of GDP on defense with clear goals to reach 5% in the coming future. In number form, Lithuania has been able to increase defense spending from $428 million to $3.6 billion from 2014 to 2025, Latvia from $293 million to $1.65 billion, and Estonia from $514 million to $1.5 billion. 

The Baltic States have evidently been able to pull their own weight in defense spending and military procurement, well before this new age of U.S. unreliability. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a push factor for the evolution of the Baltic defense sector, underscoring that their dedication towards a strong security environment is not simply a response to Washington’s drawbacks, but an entrenched commitment towards collective defense. Their geographic position to Russia requires continuous advancements to military infrastructure, and their adherence to NATO’s defense spending requirement is due to the value of a large military alliance for their own security architecture. The termination of the BSI would most likely signal the end of funding for joint military exercises between the Baltic States and the United States, but joint programs with other European member states will remain frequent. Additionally, the U.S. 2026 budget proposal did not reference the termination of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), a separate funding program for European defense projects and rotational troop deployment in Eastern Europe that still had a $2.91 billion budget in 2025. 

Discussion over funding cuts to the Baltic Security Initiative casts doubts upon the future of U.S.-Baltic relations, especially during a time where deterrence and defense preparation are necessary against neighboring Russia. However, the prospect of financial withdrawal did not indicate a total termination to the transatlantic alliance. Advocates of the Baltic States within the U.S. political sphere are actively voicing opposition towards President Donald Trump’s suggested funding cuts. In 2025, U.S. Senator Michael Bennet and Senator Ruben Gallego urged the Department of State and the Department of War to maintain the BSI and Section 333 funding that was set throughout 2026. Senator Bennet also started the Baltic Security Initiative Act to officially codify the BSI with official mention in the 2027 fiscal proposal, and introduction of his 2026 Baltic Security Assessment Act would require the Department of War to regularly update U.S. Congress on Baltic security threats, as well as how the United States and NATO are moderating the threats. The U.S. Senate’s Baltic Freedom Caucus, led by Senator Dick Durbin and Chuck Grassey, actively advocates for increased awareness over the Baltic States within the U.S. political sphere, maintaining a strong focus over why the transatlantic partnership is necessary for deterring Russian aggression. The presence of a caucus for Baltic affairs in the Senate is historic, as it demonstrates a withstanding institutional commitment to the region through lawmakers who prioritize the transatlantic relationship. Even though the BSI was ultimately maintained, debates over its potential termination highlighted vulnerabilities in security cooperation between the U.S. and the Baltic States.   

The new age of U.S. involvement in Europe, or lack thereof, has signaled to the region that reliance on the United States for security is not feasible. NATO as an institution cannot expect the United States to take responsibility in leading the alliance, as doing so would exacerbate the vulnerabilities of Europe’s security architecture. European states, including the Baltics, have begun to increase their obligations to NATO, picking up where the United States has fallen short. But understanding that the United States may not be as reliable of a transatlantic partner under the current administration does not mean that all diplomatic and defense-related ties have been cut. There remains a notable movement in the U.S. political sphere to maintain the alliances that formed the post-World War II international order, with the Baltic States being heavily advocated for. The future of the transatlantic relationship between the U.S. and the Baltic States may not be one of guaranteed transactional cooperation, but the region’s growing self-sufficiency and the push for ongoing U.S. support provides grounds for a resilient partnership.