Russia’s formula for (no)peace

Elīna Vrobļevska, Researcher at the Centre for East European policy studies

Potential peace talks between Russia and Ukraine have been at the centre of public debate for several months. While Ukraine is seen in the Western media as the initiator of peace, the opposite picture is being painted on the Russian side. Russian information manipulation tactics create a certain perception of Ukraine as an aggressive state that rejects peace talks, while Russia positions itself as a rational and peaceful negotiating partner that, among other things, comes forward with its own offers and initiatives.

Who actually wants peace?

At the beginning of the summer, Vladimir Putin voiced on what terms he was ready to enter peace talks. The Kremlin master’s proposal included such conditions as the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, and Donetsk and recognition of these regions by Kyiv within their administrative boundaries – not just the territory actually controlled by the Russian army. There is also a demand for the lifting of sanctions and for Ukraine to abandon the idea of joining NATO. The Ukrainian side has rejected these conditions. The Kremlin in its own information space presents them as reasonable, fair and generous towards Ukraine. In reality, they would mean Russia’s victory in the war against its neighbour.

The rejection of these “fair and generous” conditions is being used to construct an anti-Ukrainian narrative that sees Kyiv as an unreasonable and pro-conflict party. By choosing to omit from such media publications the fact that Ukraine has also clearly outlined the terms of the negotiations, which include respect for the country’s territorial sovereignty, Russia is manipulating the information available in the information space to create an image of a peace-oriented actor which is in its favour and which, at the same time, does not back down from its objectives.

At the same time, however, Russia is ready to offer its own arguments and theories as to why Ukraine has rejected offers of peace talks in certain cases and contexts. One of the most frequently cited arguments is the law allegedly adopted by Ukraine which prohibits direct peace negotiations with Russia. It is important to note here, however, that the decree issued by President Zelensky in October 2022 speaks of direct negotiations with President Putin, not Russia in general. This ”inaccuracy” in the interpretation of the law hides the fact that the Kremlin’s master is excluded from the negotiating process, so as not to create the impression of him as persona non grata. At the same time, it shows the presence of the personification of power in Russia, when the head of state is equated with the state and vice versa.

At the same time, Russia is trying to create the impression that its conditions for peace talks are getting tougher, based on developments on the front, such as the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk. This tactic can also be seen in international attempts to resolve the conflict, where Russia refuses to participate in formats where unfavourable terms are being pushed. According to expert assessments, Kursk is proof that Ukraine does not want peaceful Russian initiatives, and it is obvious that Russia will move towards peace talks from a much more hardline position in the future.

The Russian information space is actively creating a perception of incompetence of the Ukrainian solution on the one hand, and hidden agendas and pressure on Russia on the other. By discrediting Ukraine’s offer and conditions, Russia leaves only one possible alternative – acceptance of the conditions put forward by the Kremlin. This is reinforced by creating an implicit threat narrative about engaging in negotiations that could lead to an unfavourable outcome for Russia.

Delegitimising the negotiating partner

The argument about the legitimacy of Volodymyr Zelensky as President of Ukraine is used as a factor for the possibility of peace talks, or rather as an obstacle to them, given that Ukraine should have held presidential elections in the spring of this year, which was not possible because of the state of war in the country. Russian representatives, such as Dmitry Peskov and Sergey Lavrov, point out that negotiations with the current Ukrainian leadership are not possible on this basis. It is also used more widely to criticise the Kyiv leadership and to justify the need for Russian “special operation” in general.

For example, Dmitry Medvedev, who is now the deputy chairman of the Security Council, claims that the people who now represent Ukraine are not authorised to talk about peace talks, which means that all this is just ‘empty chit-chat’. Peskov, on the other hand, argues that from a legal point of view, Zelensky lost his legitimacy months ago. He admits that the Ukrainian conflict is extremely complicated, but its reason, according to Peskov, is clear: they are trying to turn Ukraine into an anti-Russian centre. Russia is generally in favour of peace, provided that national security is guaranteed and that the tasks set for the “special operation” are fulfilled – failing to achieve these goals will make it impossible to force Russia into peace, whereas Zelensky has deliberately escalated the confrontation by going on the offensive in Kursk in order to compromise the possibility of negotiations.

Overall, the Russian-constructed image of the Kyiv leadership, led by President Zelensky, is that of an illegitimate governing regime whose actions, both pre-war and present, are aimed at escalating conflict, Russophobia, and endangering Russia and its compatriots. In this way, the Kremlin is trying to combine two parts of its own narrative. One of them justifies the start of a special operation to save the compatriots from the repressive internal political regime of Zelensky. And the other part of it tells of an illegitimate leader who, moreover, is out to escalate the conflict rather than seeking solutions to end it. This manipulation of information by the Kremlin is aimed both at discrediting the terms of the peace talks put forward by Ukraine and at justifying Russia’s apparent refusal to take part in them, so as not to look like an uncompromising party, but to maintain the image of a ‘peacemaker’.

A third wheel

Regarding potential peace talks, the debate in the information space is not only about how and on what terms they could take place, but also whether and who will mediate potential peace talks. While the public information seems to point to a fundamental need for a mediator as an integral part of the peace talks, which both sides want, a closer look at the Russian information space shows that the question of a third-party presence becomes more controversial, especially when it comes to a mediator from the West.

In the Russian media, one can often see accusations against potential mediators. Prominent among them are the collective West, the UK, the US, and Germany. Zelensky’s “peace formula” is constantly criticised and presented as an ultimatum that Ukraine and the West are trying to impose on Russia. Peace summits are presented as “a manifestation of deception on the part of the Anglo-Saxons and their Ukrainian puppets”. Their purpose is to promote the unviable Ukrainian “peace formula”. This view is supplemented, for example, by Lavrov’s statement that the West will not allow honest negotiations with Russia based on UN principles, as well as by public doubts that Kyiv is ready for peace and that the ‘curators’ agree to it in principle.

This characterisation of the situation and the context only feeds a pre-established narrative in which Ukraine’s efforts to integrate into Western institutions are characterised through US and Western efforts to manipulate and subjugate Ukraine to achieve a strategic victory over Russia. This frames the possibility of peace negotiations within the broader context of the Russia-West conflict, diverting attention from the conditions offered by Ukraine and excluding it as an independent actor.

Other Western countries that have publicly declared their commitment to the peace process are similarly discredited. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s declaration of readiness to join the peace talks process was linked to the fact that Scholz’s party was defeated in the elections in the federal states in the east of the country. It is alleged that Scholz wants to resolve the conflict in order to gain an advantage over the political forces that won the elections – AfD and BSW, which are considered, among other things, pro-Kremlin. The chancellor’s foreign policy influence is also questioned: unlike Angela Merkel, he has no personal contacts with Putin, and he has difficult relations with Zelensky and the US leadership. It can be concluded from this that the current political situation does not allow for effective peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.

The 2022 peace talks in Istanbul are mentioned as an essential component. Russian media picked up on Turkish President Erdogan’s claim that certain lobby groups did not want the Istanbul talks to end successfully. This helped them revitalise the Kremlin narrative that an agreement had supposedly been reached with Ukraine. However, the aggressive and brutal attack by Russian troops on civilians is not mentioned among the reasons why the agreement never came into force. The blame is placed on the United Kingdom, which allegedly systematically obstructs the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict by supporting initiatives that jeopardise peace efforts in Ukraine. The Istanbul talks in 2022 were allegedly derailed precisely because of the fault of the former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

In the Russian public sphere, the need for a mediator in peace talks is mainly framed by pointing to the incompetence or unwillingness of potential mediators to make peace – if the potential third party is a Western country. In turn, countries that are “pro-Russia” are praised and their political rhetoric on negotiations is supported and used to reinforce the Kremlin’s narrative. The pervasive element in this context, however, is the unchanged one of Ukraine’s unwillingness and inability to make peace on its own, thus also shifting the discussion on negotiations into the broader context of Russian-Western retaliation.

A significant part of the narrative in the Russian information space about possible peace talks to resolve the Ukrainian conflict is the emphasis on Putin’s initiative to offer peace and his readiness to engage in peace talks. This is contrasted with Ukraine’s allegedly unstable position on the termination of the war, which is manifested in the escalation of the conflict as interpreted by Russia and the previous “bad experience” when the Istanbul talks did not lead to an agreement. For example, on vedomosti.ru it is consistently mentioned that even though Russia was not invited to the June peace summit, Putin has repeatedly spoken about his readiness to participate in the talks. In order to manipulate the perception of potential peace talks in the information space, the Russian media uses selective tactics of fact-use, which involves interpreting facts or withholding information to create the Kremlin’s desired view of the possibility of peace – Russia wants peace but Ukraine is escalating the conflict.

* Material first published on Delfi.lv

* The creation of this fact-checking material was funded by the European Media and Information Foundation, managed by the “Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation”.

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