Russia’s historical sovereignty or the role of history in contemporary Russia
Mārcis Balodis, Researcher at the Centre for East European policy studies
This year marks the 79th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, which means that once again attention will be paid to how the Second World War began, unfolded, ended, and what its long-term consequences were. While the dominant Western narrative is that the war was a tragedy and must not be allowed to happen again, contemporary Russian rhetoric treats the events of the Second World War in a radically different way. In the Russian context, special attention should be paid to the observation that Russia does not care about history alone: modern Russia seeks to use the events of the past to justify itself in the present and to attract supporters.
Nowhere without Russia
World War II is said to have started only when Nazi Germany invaded Poland, and Western leaders looked the other way. The only significant armed resistance to Nazi Germany was reportedly offered by the USSR, and from 1941 the US and Britain began to provide limited support to the USSR. Not to mention the repression of civilians in Nazi-occupied territories. Even after the war, the USSR was actively involved in building a global security architecture to prevent the outbreak of new global conflicts, for example by reinforcing the principle of no border violations in Europe.
It was only because of the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev and his team that the USSR began to come apart at the seams, and instantly the collective West began to rock the global boat, causing instability. It is argued that the collapse of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the USSR was brought about by the Western countries’ complicity, and soon many conflicts broke out in Eastern Europe as the local Nazis began to make their demands. Even more, the Western promise not to expand NATO eastwards was broken at the first opportunity. According to this interpretation, the West has still not had enough: in 2014, a nationalist coup was allegedly staged in Ukraine, at one point also heating up the situation in Moldova.
But of course, the most difficult situation is in the Baltic States, which are ruled by pro-Western Nazi collaborators who allegedly dare to provoke Russia into open conflict, for example by regularly carrying out military exercises or, God forbid, by placing military installations on their territories. Finally, the moral of the story is revealed: the West has not learned from the experience of the Second World War. In this way, the pro-Kremlin vision tries to draw parallels between Nazi Germany and the modern Baltic States and Ukraine to give the impression that the countries close to Russia are in fact powder kegs around which sparks regularly fly. This is followed by the scare that it may soon be too late to stop the situation.
This set of messages, in the context of a single publication, is in itself a selection of contemporary Russian greatest hits. In the same breath, it silences any cooperation between the USSR and Nazi Germany before the Second World War (for example, in the division of Poland) and emphasises the message about the heroic struggle of the USSR against Nazism in Europe. Of course, the famous legend about the non-expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe is not forgotten. The problem here is that Mikhail Gorbachev himself admitted that he did not receive any guarantees that there would be no NATO expansion. Today’s events allegedly are also caused by the wicked Western powers and their accomplices, only to spite or even threaten Russia.
Foundations of identity
Russia’s reference to the anniversary of the end of the Second World War is logical, as the Second World War is the cornerstone of modern Russian identity. From Russia’s point of view, it is a historic event that intertwined heroism, selflessness, the fight against, and, ultimately, the victory over evil, which placed Russia alongside the United States as one of the world’s dominant powers. Naturally, Russia seeks to use this as an example of its good intentions, but at the same time, it illustrates a feature of modern Russia. Russia consistently avoids revising its history, distancing itself from anything unflattering, or trying to blame it on others. In other words, Russia wants to perpetuate the idea that the victors cannot be punished and that the USSR’s contribution to the destruction of Nazism means the forgiveness of all sins.
But revisiting the past is not only about highlighting one’s past achievements but also about using them to build and underpin one’s politics in the present. Russia presents the Second World War and the Cold War as examples of its good intentions and its desire for global stability, which its predecessor, the USSR, was able to achieve not thanks to but despite the Western countries. The idea is developed that all the disasters in and around Russia are a direct consequence of the recklessness and two-facedness of the Western countries. In this way, the impression is created, by simple reasoning, that Russia is a victim, that is, that it is not valued, and that Russia’s sovereign interests are being aggressively ignored by the wicked Western countries.
In the view of modern Russia, it is impossible to recognise the 2014 revolution in Ukraine as a logical and direct consequence of the democratic process – the dissatisfaction of the population with the political course chosen by the government at the time. Instead, Russia refers to the ‘collective West’ that is trying to harm it. Similarly, the Baltic States’ efforts to defend themselves militarily are interpreted as the “long arm” of the West, rather than the desire of independent states to defend themselves from the main source of threat in the region.
At the same time, these same messages blatantly seek to demonise anyone who is against Russia for any reason. In this way, Russia is trying to demonstrate very clearly how good and noble its position has always been, only to be constantly thwarted by the haters around it. Combined with the idea of Western two-facedness, the demonisation reinforces the idea of Russia as a besieged fortress, as in that Russia is surrounded by various sources of threat, all of which share the same characteristics – Nazism, or at least sympathy for it.
This is in line with the rhetoric of Russia’s war in Ukraine, where one of the explanations for why Russia is attacking Ukraine in the first place is the argument about the threat allegedly posed by Ukrainian Nazis to Russia. In other words, this approach helps to divide actors, in a very simplistic way, into the categories of “us” and “them”, without any attempt to explain the interests and reasoning of the different parties.
At the same time, a subtle sentiment that Russia would be better off cooperating runs through this whole set of messages. Between the lines about the Nazis and Russia’s oppressors, there is the idea that some historical processes, including armed conflicts and wars, have happened because Western countries have been too permissive, and that it was Russia that ultimately had to deal with them. These messages are therefore accompanied by thinly veiled threats that it is finally time for the Western countries to deal with the situation before Russia starts to do so itself.
Sovereignty
At a fundamental level, this is an example of how modern Russia deals with its history, as in Russian history is what Russia wants. The adviser to the Russian President Vladimir Medinsky said in 2020 that Russia needed historical sovereignty, that is, the ability for Russia to interpret its history independently. Although the idea itself is questionable, it includes the notion that Russian history has so far been interpreted by others, something that modern Russia understandably does not like. Contemporary Russia actively seeks to draw parallels between the present and the events of the last century to construct an image of its heroism, while trying to attract and activate its supporters through it, at the same time avoiding any criticism of its history. It is no coincidence that the Katyn massacre is still an issue for Russia, which is still trying to shift the responsibility for the event onto the Nazis. Russia conceals and distorts the unflattering pages of its history, and in this way tries to convince its audience of Russia’s allegedly special role and good intentions that are constantly thwarted by the Western countries, which are covering up for the Nazis.
As a result, history serves two diametrically opposed but complementary functions for Russia. On the one hand, it cultivates pride and prestige in Russia’s willingness to make sacrifices in the name of the right cause, which can be sold to audiences even today. Such heroic stories also help to create the impression that Russia is ready to do it alone, without the involvement or support of others. On the other hand, it helps to maintain feelings of resentment and discontent. The purpose of such messages is not only to demonise the West but also to convey to the audience that the West is not trustworthy and that it has long been against Russia, which has done nothing condemnable.
* Material first published on Delfi.lv
* The creation of this fact-checking material was funded by the European Media and Information Foundation, managed by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.
