Elīna Vrobļevska, Researcher at the Centre for East European policy studies

The Ukraine Peace Summit and NATO’s Washington Summit were the central events of this summer in transatlantic security and defence policy, demonstrating the Alliance’s commitment to developing its support for Ukraine and strengthening the defence capabilities of European countries. The Kremlin has also used this time to publicly burnish its alternative security and cooperation alliance organisation and bilateral formats, placing its narrative in information space in Russia and abroad about the country’s success in strengthening and expanding new alliances at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit.

Although founded more than 20 year ago as a Eurasian regional cooperation institution primarily focused on discussing region-specific issues in the security, economic and cultural fields, the SCO has had limited impact and relevance in the wider international and practical context. The values and operating principles of the organisation have so far not been conducive to deeper integration between countries and a united international position, adhering to the principle of “non-interference” in cooperation. The range of members included the region’s major players – Russia and China, as well as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In 2017, India and Pakistan joined the organisation, two years later Iran did the same.

Russia’s new world within the SCO

The Astana Summit in July, which expanded the membership to include Belarus and outlined the way forward for the organisation, pointed to a collectively achievable goal of broadening the range of issues to be addressed. In the context of the SCO Summit, the information space first emphasised the strength and robustness of the organisation itself in the context of the overall international system. This is done in several aspects.

For example, the organisation is positioned as one of the elements in preserving the international system established by the UN. This idea is very typical of Putin’s rhetoric, arguing for the central role of the UN in ensuring the international system, the rule of law and order. Putin sees the UN as an instrument for the realisation of Russian interests, because within it Russia has relative strength through its permanent membership in the Security Council, through which Russia can pursue its foreign policy agenda and ‘safeguard the international system’.

In addition, he believes that the organisation promotes innovative processes in international organisations through its work with the UN. As of 1st of July, Russia held the presidency of the UN Security Council for a month, which also meant the right to set the agenda, which Russia has used to prioritise cooperation with regional organisations – the CIS, the CSTO and the SCO. The role of regional organisations in the UN institutional framework is exaggerated to increase the importance and role of the Russian organisational formats, and is not based on the real capacity of the associations.

Citing Chinese political experts, the media have multiplied reports of the SCO as an organisation providing genuine multilateral representation, countering hegemonism, power politics and bloc confrontation, and building a new model of cooperation. The Kremlin narrative frames the SCO as the foundation of a new world order, emphasising the commonality of values, synergy of interests, and cultural values that unite the organisation’s member states. Through this prism, the role of the organisation is “cultivated”, with Russian experts pointing out that the scale of its representation – economically and in terms of population – indicates its capacity to address issues of global, not just regional, political and security dimensions. Indirectly, the initiative of the Russian President within the organisation is underlined, precisely in the construction of the Eurasian security architecture, in the exclusion of any military presence of “external powers”. It is also stressed that it is Putin who sets the organisation’s priorities for the future. The Chinese and Russian experts’ views are complemented by Putin’s acknowledgement that the organisation’s activities are proof of the world’s multipolarity. In the view of Russian experts, the attractiveness of the organisation for its member states lies in the possibility of pursuing the national interests of each country without disadvantaging the other members. In particular, Putin’s participation in the summit has strengthened the influence of Moscow and its allies on the international stage.

This synergy of Russian and Chinese narratives is clearly aimed at multiplying the strength and power of the organisation at the summit, demonstrating to its participants and the wider public the importance of the organisation in contrast to the Western world order. The aim is quite clear: to create a balance of power in the information space in people’s perception of the presence of an alternative institutional force in the international system driven by Russia.

Competition with NATO

In an effort to create opposition to NATO’s institutional framework, the media coverage of the Astana Summit is designed to clearly outline and contrast two competing poles within the organisation – Moscow’s allies versus Washington’s allies.

In the Russian information space, the SCO summit is compared to the NATO summit as a meeting of key geopolitical players, thus shifting the focus of the power debate from the Western institution to the framework of the Eurasian organisation, clearly pointing to this organisation as an alternative version of NATO. The participation of Russia and China is cited as a pillar of this organisation’s cooperation, challenging the order created and maintained by NATO, including in the military sphere.

The importance of the organisation in comparison to NATO is underlined, among other things, by statements during the summit about China’s involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, including accusations against NATO for its role in the conflict, as well as its interference in China’s internal affairs and the discrediting of its domestic and foreign policies. Putin, for his part, used the summit to reiterate his position that it is US policy, with its satellites at the forefront, that is to blame for the Ukrainian “crisis”. Putin publicly expressed the view that a ceasefire could not be declared in the hope of positive steps on the Ukrainian side and a mediated settlement of the conflict, stressing that Russia has always been in favour of negotiations and has never refused them, but that he found the usefulness of mediation unlikely.In this way, the Kremlin is trying to show that it is working to end the war by actively offering possible solutions, thus making Ukraine and its allies look like irrational, intransigent and inhumane players, guilty of perpetuating the war. Moreover, the China aspect is used to further deepen the impression of the West’s collective, ‘questionable’ stance not only towards Russia but also towards its most important allies, reinforcing the unfavourable perception created.

The main thing to remember is that “Russia has plenty of friends!”

The SCO Summit not only built the image of the organisation as a collective representation, but also highlighted the role and importance of leaders. In the context of the current international situation, the private contact between the Russian and Chinese leaders, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, was presented as an aspect of strengthening stability and peace, including in the Eurasian region. For example, Kazakhstan’s President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, is quoted as underlining Russia’s invaluable contribution to enhancing the potential of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, for which Putin was publicly thanked on the sidelines of the summit.The close cooperation between leaders is also implicitly praised through the assessment of the leaders of Russia’s partner countries. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko pointed out that the West has not been able to provide global security and that there are no leaders in the West who are capable of taking responsible decisions independently. Xi and Putin’s close personal relations and political ties are framed as a guarantee for the stability of the partnership, making both leaders and their staying in power a de facto precondition for peace.

Each of Putin’s meetings at the summit was also widely covered in the media, giving the impression of a growing number of Russian allies. In the context of the summit, the meetings with the Iranian President and the rapprochement between the two countries, the admission of Belarus to the Organisation’s membership, and Russia’s political triumph within the Organisation were highlighted. Russia-Turkey relations were also given a lot of attention, underlining Turkey’s willingness to move closer to Russia and build closer economic relations. The Kremlin, for its part, is using this opportunity to point to Turkey’s past “wrongs” against Russia in trying to mediate in the Ukraine conflict. The narrative is constructed as if this is Turkey’s initiative to move closer to Russia. It is stressed that US pressure and sanctions against Russia make it difficult for Russia and Turkey to carry out economic transactions, but both countries have expressed their readiness to remove obstacles and double trade volumes. After the summit, news of Turkey’s wish to join the SCO also appeared in the Russian news media.

The media focus during the summit on Putin’s busy schedule, numerous bilateral talks, and Russia’s partnership with China, as well as Turkey’s desire for cooperation with Russia, is aimed at creating a perception of Russia’s popularity and demand for cooperation.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Astana has been highlighted in the Russian media as an important instrument of Kremlin diplomacy and bilateral cooperation, demonstrating Russia’s foreign policy orientation and political viability, which is important in the context of its isolation. It is also important for the Kremlin to maintain and demonstrate the usefulness and development of its Asian vector, which is the lifeline of Russian foreign policy today. It is worth noting that several of the narratives of the summit have been reprinted in the Russian media, with reference to the Chinese media, thus highlighting the ideological link in the rhetoric that seems to have been reinforced in the public space, not only by the leaders of the countries. This, at least in the context of this particular event, marks a tendency towards less need to confirm the news from the perspective of “Western experts”.

* Material first published on Delfi.lv

* The creation of this fact-checking material was funded by the European Media and Information Foundation, managed by the “Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation”.