Originally published in Latvian on www.delfi.lv
Mārcis Balodis, researcher at the Centre for East European Policy Studies
With Ukraine’s success on the battlefield, gradually liberating the territories occupied by Russia, the desolation left by Russia comes to the forefront of international attention. In most cases, the desolation, while tragic, is to some extent natural in the context of war, such as scenes of destroyed residential houses, infrastructure nodes and looted shops.
Unfortunately, cruelty and brutality against Ukrainians has become ingrained in the wider public’s consciousness as a feature of Russian aggression. In mid-September, Ukrainian armed forces reclaimed control of the city of Izyum in Kharkiv Oblast, where a mass grave containing the remains of over 400 people, the majority of whom were civilians, was discovered.
Furthermore, according to information provided by Ukrainian authorities, the majority of the remains show signs of torture.[1] The Russian armed forces have controlled Izyum since March, so there is reason to believe that this will be yet another tragic testimony to the Russian armed forces’ cruelty in the seven-month-long war. This was only supplemented by the statement of the head of the Ukrainian police that after the occupiers left, torture facilities were discovered in previously controlled territories[2], revealing the scope and systematic nature of Russia’s crimes.
Russia’s reaction to the international outrage over the atrocities committed was, predictably, aggressive and quick. Alexander Malkevich, a member of the Civic Chamber (Общественнaя палата) of the Russian Federation, clearly stated that Kyiv is attempting to organise another provocation similar to the one in Bucha, and that thousands of people have already been killed for this purpose. He drew parallels with the events in Bucha, where information about the dead civilians only appeared after the Russian armed forces withdrew, which, in his opinion, proves Russia’s innocence and provocation by Western countries and Kyiv. Finally, he concluded that a new scandal is unlikely to emerge.[3] It is important to note that, while the Civic Chamber is formally a consultative body in the fields of socioeconomic development and human rights protection, its members are appointed by the President of Russia.[4] Even Maxim Shevchenko, a former member of the Chamber, described it as a choir of boys and girls that support the initiatives of the government.[5]
Take one
The link to the events in Bucha is not only made because the Russian armed forces are accused of atrocities against civilians in both cases. Bucha’s case was significant in the Russian information space because pro-Kremlin websites rushed to verify Ukrainian statements, eventually reaching the “conclusion” that the scenes that travelled around the world were a provocation and theatre. According to them, the Russian armed forces left the city on 30 March, but reports of injured civilians only began to circulate on the evening of 2 April, implying that it was staged. Furthermore, pro-Kremlin websites actively used the argument that the same corpses can be seen in different photos and videos, or that their location has changed, implying external manipulation.[6]
However, due to investigative journalism, the “explanations” given by Russian representatives for what was going on were quickly debunked. According to “Bellingcat” journalists, corpses of civilians can already be seen on the streets of Bucha on 1 April, the day Ukrainian forces arrived. Furthermore, Russian accusations of moving bodies were refuted, which are explained by low-quality video recording combined with the influence of the surrounding environment.[7] However, the strongest counterargument was probably the published satellite photos, which confirmed that human remains were already visible on the streets of Buch in mid-March, next to the same objects that were later captured on video in early April.[8]
In the current situation, Russia is actively attempting to draw parallels to demonstrate Ukraine’s allegedly existing plans to repeat the Bucha scenario, this time in Izyum. Vitaly Ganchev, the head of the military-civilian administration in the pro-Kremlin Kharkiv region, stated that Ukrainian mercenaries had come to the region to “clean it up” in order to place responsibility on Russia. Sergey Markov, the director of the Russian Institute of Political Studies, backed him up, claiming that Kyiv’s “Sonderkommandos” are mercilessly shooting at local residents, whose bodies are being displayed in public places. As a result, this story is intended to be distributed to Western media in order to generate global outrage over Russia’s crimes.[9]
Dehumanise and denigrate
Understandably, these messages are primarily aimed at Russia’s domestic audience. The Kremlin understands that even a de facto monopolistic position in the information space does not preclude news from Ukraine from reaching the local information space, particularly through uncontrolled channels such as “Telegram”. As a result, the Kremlin has a logical need to defend itself against accusations and objections that the presumably justifiable war is proceeding in accordance with generally accepted norms of behaviour.
It is important to note that none of these pseudo-refutations seek to explain what happened, but rather to identify the “true” perpetrator. This is only supplemented by the use of terms like “Banderites”, “fascists” and “Sonderkommandos” to make it clear to Russian society what Russia is allegedly fighting against. At the same time, it should be noted that the use of such terms contributes to Russia’s dehumanisation of Ukrainians in general; that they are not regarded as people deserving of rights, even during the war. Instead, they are associated with bloodthirsty executioners, reinforcing the notion of Russia’s role in resolving the Ukrainian issue.
However, assuming that the messages are only for internal use would be a mistake. Such messages are also aimed at Western countries, which explains why such informative activity is frequently seen in various “Telegram” groups. Western nations have prohibited the operation of Russia’s traditional channels of influence, including television networks and websites, since 24 February, and Russia’s transition to various social network platforms is an effort to adapt to the situation in a more challenging environment. Through these channels, Russia tries to convince Western societies about two main issues. First of all, that Russia is innocent and has become a victim of a Ukrainian and Western conspiracy. This coincides with the tactics used by Russia for years to present itself as the bearer of world peace and stability, whose efforts are always hampered by Western conspiracies aimed at humiliating Russia. Already from the case of the downed Malaysian passenger plane in 2014, Russia has used the tactic to minimise its guilt by flooding the information field with contradictory information, creating the impression that neither side is disseminating true information. Second, Russia’s disinformation about crimes against civilians serves a more dramatic purpose. Particularly, that Russia is attempting to tarnish Ukraine in the eyes of Western society. Pro-Kremlin websites go to great lengths to create the impression that it is Ukraine that is committing crimes against civilians, which naturally reduces support for Ukrainians.
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has had undeniable consequences: Russia is now in international isolation and is toxic in the eyes of Western countries, has been sanctioned, and has also lost the initiative on the battlefield, as Ukraine gradually liberates territories. One of the key factors to Ukraine’s success has been the support of Western countries, which has not only contributed to military-technical assistance, but also to public interest, creating an additional incentive for countries to help Ukraine. From Russia’s perspective, the situation is intolerable, and every effort should be made to undermine public support. According to Russia, this should change society’s position, effectively constraining Ukraine and limiting its ability to defend itself. Russia is attempting to appeal to Western countries’ generally accepted understanding of the inexcusable nature of such actions and the resulting condemnation by accusing Ukrainians of human rights violations. This would allow Russia to take the initiative in the information space, implying that the Ukrainians are untrustworthy and should not be assisted, which would, understandably, change the balance of power on the battlefield.
One war, many fronts
It would be a mistake to believe that the war is limited to a single – physical – battlefield. The Ukrainian war has clearly demonstrated that there are multiple fronts within a single war, even surprising with Ukraine’s ability to operate in the information space. Despite its bravado, Russia has yet to achieve a significant victory on the battlefield, prompting Russia to employ a variety of asymmetric tools to change the situation on the front. Evidence of Russian crimes in Bucha and Irpin does not leave much room for doubting that the civilians were killed by Russian armed forces, which is consistent with Russia’s reluctance to attack non-military targets for the purpose of intimidation, as seen this year, and with evidence of Ukrainian deportations.[10]
The crimes of Russian troops in Ukraine exposed another reality of modern Russia: the low value of human life. This is evident in Russia’s war tactics, which include deliberately attacking residential areas of cities and systematically killing residents, as well as actions against captured Ukrainian soldiers. It would also be inaccurate to put all of the blame solely on Russian soldiers, because the Kremlin’s policy in recent years has included the deliberate and systematic demonisation of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, labelling the country and its people as nationalists and even Nazis, the cruel manifestations of which we are currently witnessing.
As the invasion of Ukraine continues, Russia will continue its information warfare in order to conceal its violations and atrocities, defame Ukraine and Western countries, and create international sentiment favourable to Russia. As the conflict progresses, Russia will find itself in a situation in which the real situation on the battlefield and in Russia itself will begin to diverge from the illusion created by propaganda, potentially reducing its effectiveness.
Finally, the violations of Russia are far too serious to be ignored by the international community. As a result, bringing the responsible Russian representatives to justice is only a matter of time, which will not be altered even by the venomous and aggressive statements of Russian propagandists.
This publication has been financed by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) that is managed by the “Calouste Gulbekian Foundation”: The sole responsibility for the content lies with the author(s) and the content may not necessarily reflect the positions of EMIF or the foundation.
[1] Emmanuelle Chaze, “Ukraine war: Izium bodies show signs of torture and execution”, Deutsche Welle, skat. 21.09.2022., https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-izium-bodies-show-signs-of-torture-and-execution/a-63163444
[2] Emmanuel Parisse, “Outrage as Ukraine Finds Mass Grave Near Liberated Izyum”, The Moscow Times, skat. 21.09.2022., https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/16/outrage-as-ukraine-finds-mass-grave-near-liberated-izyum-a78807
[3] Варвара Кошечкина, “В Общественной палате России заявили о провокации в Изюме по аналогии с Бучей”, Lenta.ru, skat. 20.09.2022., https://web.archive.org/web/20220913092647/https:/lenta.ru/news/2022/09/13/buche_izum/
[4] Consultant.ru, “Федеральный закон “Об Общественной палате Российской Федерации””, skat. 21.09.2022., http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_52651/f4b1637ce291cae5a4efcfada80b047a7baf757b/
[5] Rambler, “Максим Шевченко: ОП превратилась в хор мальчиков и девочек”, skat. 21.09.2022., https://woman.rambler.ru/other/44437650-maksim-shevchenko-op-prevratilas-v-hor-malchikov-i-devochek/
[6] Archive Today, “Что случилось в Буче? Полный разбор украинской провокации”, skat. 21.09.2022., https://archive.ph/OQ5KG
[7] Eliot Higgins, “Russia’s Bucha ‘Facts’ Versus the Evidence”, Bellingcat, skat. 20.09.2022., https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2022/04/04/russias-bucha-facts-versus-the-evidence/
[8] Gerry Doyle, “Satellite images show civilian deaths in Ukraine town while it was in Russian hands”, Reuters, skat. 21.09.2022., https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/satellite-images-show-civilian-deaths-ukraine-town-while-it-was-russian-hands-2022-04-05/
[9] Петр Кузнецов, “Теперь Изюм, Купянск и Балаклея: Украина готовит новую провокацию в стиле Бучи”, Punkt A, skat. 21.09.2022., https://punkt-a.info/news/federalnoe/teper-izyum-kupyansk-i-balakleya-ukraina-gotovit-novuyu-provokatsiyu-v-stile-buchi
[10] Anthony Blinken, “Russia’s “Filtration” Operations, Forced Disappearances, and Mass Deportations of Ukrainian Citizens ”, U.S. Department of State, skat. 21.09.2022., https://www.state.gov/russias-filtration-operations-forced-disappearances-and-mass-deportations-of-ukrainian-citizens/