Originally published in Latvian on www.delfi.lv
Mārcis Balodis, researcher at the Centre for East European Policy Studies
While the war for survival and defeat of the aggressor is still going on in Ukraine, it is worth paying attention to another battlefield of war where Russia is trying its best to outdo its adversaries — the information war. Physical warfare does not diminish the importance of information, quite the contrary — the power of information helps to achieve objectives not only on the battlefield, but even beyond it. Information allows you to strengthen and increase your resolve and readiness to fight, while at the same time weakening your opponent’s resolve, which extends to your opponent’s supporters, who play an important role in this context. Naturally, Russia is actively trying to undermine not only the fighting spirit of the Ukrainians, but also the readiness of the whole Western world to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian imperialist aggression.
Special Regime in Special Circumstances
On 2 August, Russian diplomat Alexander Trofimov told the United Nations Conference on the Review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that Russia had never threatened to use its nuclear weapons. According to him, any accusations against Russia in regard to nuclear threats, especially in the context of the Ukrainian war, are unfounded and out of touch with reality. He also explained that Russia would only use nuclear weapons if the survival of the Russian state was threatened by conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. In his view, these two hypothetical scenarios have nothing to do with the current situation in Ukraine. Understandably, the diplomat did not miss the opportunity to blame NATO, whose actions could allegedly trigger one of the above scenarios.[1] The diplomat has thus made it seem clear that Russia is a responsible nuclear power that does not and has not used its nuclear arsenal for political purposes as an instrument of intimidation. But the problem is that such a statement is inconsistent with Russian actions and statements, not only since 24 February, but even further back.
Already on 27 February, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the combat readiness of the Russian nuclear deterrent to be increased at a meeting with representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Armed Forces. He justified it on the basis of aggressive Western statements and illegitimate sanctions.[2] It is worth noting that the order itself is interesting due to its vagueness. Nuclear deterrent forces include intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and nuclear-capable submarines. However, unlike NATO’s DEFCON combat readiness system, which is publicly available, Russia’s nuclear readiness status is classified. In addition, Putin ordered the nuclear deterrent to be in “special service mode” (особый режим несения службы),[3] which does not clarify exactly to what degree, and therefore the nuclear forces are on standby. Already on the third day after the invasion, in response to Western insistence, Russia clearly and unequivocally escalated the nuclear situation. The vagueness of the order directly suggests that the move was more political than military, i.e., deliberately to maintain uncertainty in order to exert political pressure. Moreover, this must be seen in the context of what Putin himself said on 24 February when he announced the launch of the attack on Ukraine. In his speech, Putin clearly warned that attempts to obstruct Russia would lead to unprecedented consequences.[4]
War in the Name of Survival
Less than a month later, on 26 March, the baton of nuclear sabre-rattling was passed to Dmitry Medvedev, former President and Prime Minister of Russia and current Vice-President of the Security Council, who felt it necessary to explain Russia’s nuclear deterrence doctrine. According to him, Russia may use nuclear weapons in cases where nuclear weapons are used against Russia or its allies, where critical infrastructure is attacked and where the statehood of Russia and its allies is threatened, even if only conventional weapons are used. He added that Russia was ready to defend its sovereignty and not let anyone even think that Russia would allow its independence to be threatened.[5] At a time of active hostilities, which are not going as the Kremlin had hoped, publicly explaining its nuclear deterrence doctrine is a clear political signal. It should be noted that Medvedev’s explanation is much more nuanced than that of diplomat Trofimov, but detail does not necessarily mean security. According to Medvedev, Russia has the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of almost any military threat. Clearly, this is a clear signal not only to Ukraine, but to the whole of Western society, because ultimately it will be Russia that will determine whether its statehood is under threat.
In early May, the Russian authorities announced that they had successfully tested Iskander mobile ballistic missiles, including a simulated missile launch. The tests simulated impacts on various objects, including infrastructure.[6] It is admissible that the exercises were planned in advance, but conducting such exercises in close proximity to NATO and the EU at a time of active hostilities with weapon systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons is clearly aimed at political escalation. In terms of context, it is worth pointing out that, in both March and April, the US cancelled previously planned tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles in order to reduce the risks of escalation and misunderstanding against the backdrop of the Ukraine war.[7] Finally, on 8 August, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that it was suspending nuclear inspections on Russian territory. Such inspections are part of the New START nuclear arms limitation treaty, under which Russia and the US commit to deploy no more than 1 550 nuclear warheads, with restrictions also applying to nuclear delivery systems. To ensure compliance and build mutual trust, the treaty provides for regular reciprocal inspections. But now the Russian authorities have suspended inspections, citing US efforts to give itself an unfair advantage in inspections by imposing visa restrictions and airspace restrictions on Russian-registered aircraft.[8] Given Russia’s apparent willingness and readiness to regularly reiterate its nuclear capabilities, limiting instruments that build mutual trust and transparency, is yet another attempt to exert political pressure.
Putin’s Main Instrument
In 2020, Russia published its Nuclear Deterrence Policy Guidelines, which made it clear that in Russian military thinking, the use of nuclear weapons is acceptable to stop hostilities on terms favourable to Russia. Thus, in Russia’s view, it is not the use of nuclear weapons that deters hostilities, but their existence and combat readiness.[9] This is why Russia does not shy away from aggressive rhetoric or regular exercises using nuclear weapons. Namely, showing off nuclear weapons is an element of information warfare, creating an interesting situation in which nuclear weapons are not only a physical and military weapon, but also an information tool that provokes a strong psychological reaction. The Russian journalist Andrei Soldatov has correctly identified that the main instrument of control in the hands of the Putin regime is intimidation[10], and there is rarely a more frightening instrument in the world than nuclear weapons. Russia projects fear to exercise reflexive control; i.e., to influence the behaviour of the other side. It was no coincidence that Putin warned against standing in Russia’s way in his speech on 24 February. This rhetoric, combined with regular reminders of Russia’s nuclear capabilities, is a tool to intimidate the Western world and act in Russia’s interests. In this way, Russia seeks to control the situation and retain the right to escalate.[11] Thus, in Russian foreign policy, nuclear weapons are not only a military weapon, but an even more powerful instrument of intimidation to try to influence the situation on the battlefield.
In summary, Russia’s attempts to justify and blame Western countries for the nuclear collapse are neither acceptable nor justified. Russia’s policy is based on manipulation to intimidate, largely relying on the psychological power of nuclear weapons. It is undeniable that in the current situation, Russia has ended up in a tight corner and is using threats to undermine Western support for Ukraine and the willingness to confront Russia. It is thus not surprising that Russia is trying to use all sorts of arguments to justify itself and denigrate assistance to Ukraine. By way of example, Russian officials have repeatedly referred to Ukraine as a threat to Russia, which is consistent with Russia’s own criteria for the use of nuclear weapons. It is therefore regrettable that nuclear sabre-rattling will not significantly diminish and will be brought back into the spotlight from time to time. But giving in to Russia’s threats and manipulation is unacceptable. After all, the continued appeasement and neglect of the Russian threat has directly emboldened Russia to aggression.
This publication has been financed by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) that is managed by the “Calouste Gulbekian Foundation”: The sole responsibility for the content lies with the author(s) and the content may not necessarily reflect the positions of EMIF or the foundation.
[1] Michelle Nichols, “West could trigger nuclear war over Ukraine, Russia says at U.N.”, Reuters, skat. 09.08.2022., https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/west-could-trigger-nuclear-war-over-ukraine-russia-says-un-2022-08-02/
[2] Наталия Королева, “Путин приказал перевести силы сдерживания ВС РФ в особый режим боевого дежурства”, Deutsche Welle, skat. 09.08.2022., https://www.dw.com/ru/putin-prikazal-perevesti-sily-sderzhivanija-vs-rf-v-osobyj-rezhim-boevogo-dezhurstva/a-60934765
[3] Turpat.
[4] Gordon Corera, “Ukraine invasion: Putin puts Russia’s nuclear forces on ‘special alert’”, BBC, skat. 09.08.2022., https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60547473
[5] Daniel Boffey, “Russia reasserts right to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine”, The Guardian, skat. 09.08.2022., https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/26/russia-reasserts-right-to-use-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-putin
[6] The Moscow Times, “Russia Simulates Nuclear Strikes Near EU”, The Moscow Times, skat. 09.08.2022., https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/05/russia-simulates-nuclear-capable-strikes-near-eu-a77586
[7] Graeme Massie, “US cancels launch of intercontinental ballistic missile to prevent relations with Russia getting worse”, The Independent, skat. 09.08.2022., https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/us-intercontinental-ballistic-missiles-launch-russia-b2049711.html
[8] NDTV, “Moscow Suspends Strategic Arms Inspections Under US Treaty”, NDTV, skat. 09.08.2022., https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/start-treaty-russia-ukraine-war-moscow-suspends-strategic-arms-inspections-under-us-treaty-3237854
[9] Dmitri Trenin, “Decoding Russia’s Official Nuclear Deterrence Paper”, Carnegie Endowment For Peace Russia, skat. 09.08.2022., https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/81983
[10] Stephen Blank, “Russian Nuclear Strategy in the Ukraine War: An Interim Report”, National Institute for Public Policy, Issue No 525, pieejams: https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/IS-525.pdf
[11] Turpat.