Decay, in the late 80’s, of the giant from the East, as it is called the defunct Soviet Union, as well as its legal successor – the Russian Federation was a unique opportunity for nations oppressed by the Kremlin, over many decades, to return to normality. This was an ideal time for former USSR components to ensure their independence, sovereignty and recover their economies in decline. The moment was availed only by the Baltic countries.
Unfortunately for the other “sister republics”, the chance was missed and the forgotten history revenge. While the Baltic countries have embraced decidedly the European vector, other nations have stalled the show more pathetic than pragmatic.
Leaders of new subjects of international law but also the peoples of these countries have realized then that the only way to ensure the independence and sovereignty is economic recovery and detach politically from the old Center.
As a result, “the mammoth of the East”, which seemed mortally wounded, recovered in a relatively short time and restored political influence over the republics that have missed unforgivably easy the chance they were given. As for the east European states the European integration was the only chance.
Transnistria – the main lever of political influence of Russia in Moldova
It should noted that the collapse of the Soviet political regime brought with it the onset of delayed bombs which were placed in advance in some of the former Soviet republics. For Moldova, such a “bomb” was Transnistria, in which, after independence, were immediately animated separatist groups led from the shadow by former Soviet KGB agents. Some of them are indicted of crimes committed on the territory of the Baltic countries.
An eloquent exponent of this category of “special envoys” of the Kremlin to undermine the political detach of the new republics from Moscow is Vladimir Antyufeyev (known also as Vladimir Alexandrov and Vladimir Shevtzov). About him it is said to have arrived in the Latvian capital, Riga, after graduating from the Higher School of Militia in Minsk.
Here, reaching the rank of captain, was appointed as head of the police criminal investigation section. Before the dissolution of the USSR, he had the rank of major. Shevtzov participated in a coup attempt against the new democratic authorities of Latvia, which resulted in many dead and after its failure fled to Moscow on August 23, 1991.
Antyufeyev is wanted by the Latvian authorities for “crimes against the state”, being accused of involvement in a coup attempt against the new Latvian authorities. Antyufeyev acknowledged in an interview that was sent in September 1991 to organize the security forces of the Transnistrian region, based on the recommendations of Colonel Victor Alksnis (now a Member of the Russian State Duma).
He had to choose between Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. “I was one of the first six employees of the Directorate of Internal Affairs of RMN (Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, as subsequently self-proclaimed the eastern part of Moldova). Following the provisions of the President (Igor Smirnov, a Russian from Siberia), I started to create security organs of RMN and later those of the ministry of state security. We present a real problem for Moldova. My life goal is to preserve this earth for Russia”, said Vladimir Shevtzov (Antyufeyev, Alexandrov) in the Transnistrian press interview.
With such “cadre”, landing across the former Soviet republics, the Kremlin has tried in the first stage (90s’ of last century), to foil any attempt at self-assertion of new democracies. Thus, when the population of Moldova was bathing in patriotic impetus, showing intent to reunify with the country it was abusively removed from through the Soviet-German Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in eastern Moldova, in districts of the left side of the Dniester river, there was organized a criminal group which occupied abusively the major state institutions and self-proclaimed the independence of that territory from the rest of the country.
Although it tried to fight back, Moldova had no chance of triumph in an unequal battle. The next stage of Russian plan followed. It aimed to give legitimacy to the regime in Tiraspol, by including it as an equal in the negotiations to regulate “the Transnistrian conflict”, but also by deploying ”peacekeepers”, whose purpose is to provide military protection to regime led by Igor Smirnov.
Later, to restore the territorial integrity of the country, the Moldovan authorities had to do, always, concessions to Russia, including failure in foreign policy. Thus, any external manifestation of Moldova, independent of Moscow, was followed by activation of animosities between Chisinau and Tiraspol (most times, having Tiraspol blocking the negotiation process in conflict resolution). Without doubt, by forming an artificial regime in Transnistria, Russia has provided a powerful lever of political influence in Moldova. Perhaps the most important one it has.
Russian agents of influence in Moldovan politics
Moldova’s legal separation of the USSR has never evolved in reality and political dissociation (typical situation for many other former Soviet republics). Most of the local political-administrative apparatus has maintained relations with the chiefs from the Center, located in Kremlin. As a result, they have managed to remain at the forefront of political life, but also in the key position in the state. Russia has used them constantly and continues to use them to thwart any attempt to loose its political influence in Moldova. Initially, pro-Russian politicians in Moldova openly expressed their options. Good example in this context serve the Communist Party of Moldova, which promoted openly before 2005, the idea of inclusion of Moldova in Russia-Belarus Union.
To mimic the solution of the Transnistrian conflict, the Kremlin has tried to “transnistrizeze” the Republic of Moldova, imposing the so-called “Kozak Memorandum” (named after its author, Dmitry Kozak). While the Tiraspol regime demanded independence from Moldova, Russia came up with “saving compromise solution”, which Chisinau was supposed to embrace as an alternative to the inevitable dismantling of the country. The memorandum provided the creation of an asymmetric federation, Transnistria being awarded to a number of powers that would later be allowed to legally separate from Moldova. Also, memorandum was seeking the legalization of the presence of Russian troops in Moldova. Moscow was on the brink of seal the future of the Republic of Moldova, but the then president of the republic, Communist Vladimir Voronin, who by then was declared among the most loyal supporters of the Kremlin refused to sign the document because it came in obvious conflict to the Constitution of the country.
After this major failure in foreign policy, Russian authorities have reviewed the strategy in selecting its favorites. Instead of Communists patchwork of parties called the Democratic Moldova Bloc was preferred. This political structure had close links with the ruling party in Russia. To punish the Communists for refusing to sign the “Kozak memorandum”, Russia has prepared a terrific scenario for their removal from the political scene in Moldova.
Thus, on the background of “orange revolutions” in Romania, Ukraine and the “Revolution of Roses” in Georgia, the Kremlin strategists planned to hold, immediately after the parliamentary elections in March 2005, mass street protests, under the pretext of fraud by the Communist Party of the elections. The chaos that would be introduced in Moldova was to culminate with the murder of one of the leading protesters. Responsible for this assassination would have been the president of the country. This meant the end of his political career and his replacement with politicians docile to Kremlin, which would be signed the “Kozak memorandum”. Russia’s revenge did not happen, however, because those who have been booked the role of leaders of the “dissatisfied masses” assumed that the scenario was laid out in the Kremlin laboratories.
As a result, the attempted coup failed. Just a few years away, Moscow newspaper Kommersant, known for his influential sources in Russian security circles, confirm the scenario laid out by Moscow in 2005 for Moldova.
After the failures suffered in foreign policy promoted in relation to the territory between the Dniester and Prut, the Kremlin has changed tactics. Now, Russia selected its followers among politicians who apparently have no connection with the Moscow political class. The new strategy is as effective as it is dangerous because it can permanently fasten Moldova on the Russia’s orbit of influence.
Economic blackmail, a mean of promoting political interests
Foreign economic relations of the Republic of Moldova were dependent, traditionally, on political and economic situation of the Russian Federation. The collapse of the USSR left Moldova, virtually, without economy, and most important industrial enterprises in the country were situated in the Transdniestria, which was occupied by the supported by Moscow separatist regime.
In addition, Russia was to Moldova the largest market by sales of wine and food products. Being for centuries a wine producing country, Moldova exported about 90 percent of wine production and 80 percent of these exports were going on the Russian market. Thus, Moldova’s annual revenue to the state budget was hundreds of millions of dollars, equal to about one third of its GDP. After the Moldovan leadership announced in 2005, about the country’s European orientation, in March 2006, in response to this policy of separation of Chisinau from Moscow, Russian authorities announced that Moldovan wines, which were sold in Russia for decades, no longer meet the standards of quality and were even dangerous for the health of Russian consumers.
Moldovan companies have lost the main outlet and have suffered losses of tens of millions of dollars, astronomical sum for a transition economy of a so small country. Moreover, the embargo has had dramatic consequences on several sectors of industry, as wine production is closely related to the production of bottles and packaging, energy consumption, water and transport.
Shortly, Moscow has banned production and import of phytosanitary products from Moldova, then left it without the natural gas in full winter. All that have widened further the economic crisis. Economic blackmail lever used by Moscow, led the Moldovan authorities to moderate foreign policy rhetoric and attempt to reclaim Kremlins’ “compassion”.
Media attack, forefront of imperial policy of Russia in Moldova
Whenever the authorities of the former USSR republics change national law within the meaning of promoting the study of the state language or media broadcasting in the state language, Russian leadership reacted weakly.
The media in Russia aggresses with relentless criticism those authorities (in recent years, such events have increased compared with the Ukraine). In Moldova, Russian media is pervasive and present in a disproportionate number to the Romanian language media (Moldovan state language).
In the catalog for the second half of 2009 of the regular editions of the State Enterprise “Posta Moldovei” (Moldovan post-office) is mentioned that there are 63 Romanian and 61 Russian language newspapers (which are edited in Russia) published in Moldova.
At the same time, in Moldova there is organized subscription to the most important periodicals in Russia (over 200 in number), including magazines. The most important Russian-language newspapers, published in Chisinau are “Komsomolskaya Pravda” (with a local supplement), “Trud”, “Argumenty y facty”, “Vremya”, “Izvestia v Moldove”, “Kommersant Plus” (financed by money of the separatist regime in Tiraspol; expresses and promotes policy of the secessionist regime), “Moldavskie vedomosti”, “Logos Press”, “Trus-7”.
In partnership with those published in Moscow, these media serve as resonance boxes of the official policy and interests of the Russian Federation in Moldova. In addition there are a number of pro-Russian press agencies (Logos Press, Novosti Moldova Interlic etc.), as well as a lot of TV channels (Pervyi Canal, NTV, RBK, RTVI, RenTV, STS, TNT, Rossiya etc..).
Taken together, they create a powerful media front against all that may prejudice the interests of Russian policy in Moldova. Whenever Kremlin sees its interests threatened, all Russian-language press creates a strong current of opinion, similar to psychosis, against the authorities in Chisinau, but also against the people of Moldova. As a result, the Russian citizens formed a hostile attitude to the peoples of the former Soviet Union republics, including Moldova.
Foreseeable development of Moldovan-Russian relations
The coming to power in Russia, as President, of Vladimir Putin meant a restoration of Moscow’s economic policies. During his stay at the head of the Kremlin, Russia has strengthened its monopoly status in the gas market in Europe. This allowed imposing their views on geopolitical issues.
Along with other European countries, Moldova is a permanent hostage to this situation. In the absence of deposits and infrastructure, Moldova industry declined dangerously in recent years, which makes it economically dependent on external factors, in particular Russia. This is even more dangerous, as Moscow has shown whenever it had the opportunity, that it can apply economic and financial restrictions against countries that are not obedient. In such circumstances, Moldova needs to refocus economic policies to the west and to be at the minimum economic dependence on Russia. But as long as on its territory there is a frozen conflict, Moldova’s chances of getting out from under the Kremlin authorities are insignificant.
Russia will continue in the future to speculate and exploit fully the issue of Transnistria, since it needs Moldova as buffer zone on the border with NATO (military bases in Romania).
Just on this basis, the Eastern Empire will not allow Moldova a closure to NATO and the European Union. Not incidentally, the Kremlin seeks to obtain a commitment from Moldova that would eternalize the status of neutrality and legalization of the Russian military presence in exchange for “concessions” in Transdniestrian issue. This “offer” would mean a further humiliation for Moldova.
Evolution of the Moldovan-Russian relations in perspective will not record a dramatic change, now that Russia’s current status quo suits them. Changes would occur only if Moldova will appear as a political force will want to detach the country from the influence of the Kremlin.
For this, however, Moldova needs to find powerful and influential allies (U.S., EU, NATO). Current geopolitical context does not allow it because the U.S. and the EU need good relations with Russia, to strengthen efforts to combat international terrorism. This makes us believe that Moldova will remain hostages in the coming years of Russia’s imperialist interests.
Conclusions
Analyzed together, methods and tools used by Russia to influence the policy of the Republic of Moldova is a true arsenal, as diverse, as it is overwhelming. All these levers are required to preserve Russian factor in Moldova and to maintain in its area of influence.
Under these conditions, Moldova has no solution other than the European integration. This conclusion is confirmed by the example of the Baltic countries, but also the countries of Eastern Europe, former members of the so-called socialist camp, which experienced a spectacular economic development in the early 2000s.
In these countries there was provided the functioning of democratic institutions and human rights. To reach such a level of democracy, Moldova needs to refocus its economy but also politics to Europe, including the closure to the North-Atlantic structures, to assure its security. Only in those circumstances it would effectively ensure its independence and sovereignty.